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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
case the defendant failed to retire bonds each year and the plaintiff
was thereby deprived of his equal chance and right to have his bonds
retired. 6 There was, therefore, not an anticipatory but an actual
breach of the contract for which plaintiff had a right to immediately
maintain his action and not wait until 1940. This was not an in-
stallment contract.7
J. P.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-DIVORCE-RIGHT TO ALIMONY TER-
MINATES UPON REMARRIAGE-RELIEF ON SEPARATION AGREEMENT.
-Plaintiff and defendant entered into a separation agreement pro-
viding primarily for the separate support and maintenance of the
plaintiff, wife. Subsequently alimony was awarded to the wife by
a judgment of divorce in her favor. Plaintiff remarried and the
defendant moved to strike from the judgment the provisions for
alimony. Held, The provisions for alimony should be stricken out,
without prejudice to plaintiff's right to seek relief under the sep-
aration agreement. Severance v. Severance, 260 N. Y. 432, 183
N. E. 909 (1933).
Where the plaintiff in a divorce action remarries after the
final judgment has been entered, the court upon proper application
of the defendant, must modify the judgment by striking out the
provisions for alimony.'
A separation agreement which provides for future support and
maintenance is in recognition of the husband's continuing liability
to support his wife.2  The consideration for the husband's agree-
ment to 'pay is his release from obligation, except as under the
separation agreement.3 Some cases hold that a valid separation
agreement is not abrogated by a subsequent judgment of divorce
Supra note 2.
SRoehm v. Horst, 178 U. S. 1, 20 Sup. Ct. 780 (1899) ; Foxell v. Fletcher,
87 N. Y. 476 (1882) ; Lorillard v. Clyde, 122 N. Y. 41, 25 N. E. 292 (1890) ;
Wharton & Co. v. Winch, 140 N. Y. 287, 35 N. E. 589 (1893); McCready v.
Lindenborn, 172 N. Y. 400, 65 N. E. 208 (1902) ; Kelly v. Security Mutual Life
Ins. Co., supra note 4.
'N. Y. CrvL PRACTICE ACT §1159. The section is mandatory. Mowbray
v. Mowbray, 136 App. Div. 513, 121 N. Y. Supp. 45 (1st Dept. 1910); Sever-
ance v. Severance, 235 App. Div. 799, 255 N. Y. Supp. 998 (2d Dept. 1932);
Linton v. Hall, 86 Misc. 560, 149 N. Y. Supp. 385 (1914); Dumproff v.
Dumproff, 138 Misc. 298, 244 N. Y. Supp. 597 (1930).
2Galusha v. Galusha, 116 N. Y. 635, 643, 22 N. E. 1114, 1116 (1889);
Winter v. Winter, 191 N. Y. 462, 473, 474, 84 N. E. 382, 386 (1908) ; Lawson v.
Lawson, 56 App. Div. 535, 537, 67 N. Y. Supp. 356, 357 (2d Dept. 1900) ; Effray
v. Effray, 110 App. Div. 545, 547, 97 N. Y. Supp. 286, 287 (1st Dept. 1905);
Dower v. Dower, 36 Misc. 559, 561, 73 N. Y. Supp. 1080, 1081 (1901).
3 Pettit v. Pettit, 107 N. Y. 677, 679, 14 N. E. 500, 502 (1887).
RECENT DECISIONS
granting alintoly;4 or at least by a divorce where no provision for
alimony is made.5 And the courts have repeatedly refused to grant
alimony where there is a prior separation agreement in full force
and effect 6 unless the allowance under the separation agreement is
inadequate. 7 "The rational of the cases seems to be that some
provision must be had for the maintenance of the wife, either by
the award of alimony or by the provisions of the agreement, and
that the husband should not be placed under double liability." 8
The general rule is that a valid separation agreement may
only be terminated by the acts 9 or mutual consent of the parties,
or by the court in an action brought for that purpose.10 However,
in the case of the separation agreement which provides for future
support and maintenance but does not fix a date of duration, as
until the parties are divorced 11 or remarry 12 or until death,13 it
'Hughes v. Cuming, 36 App. Div. 302, 55 N. Y. Supp. 256 (2d Dept. 1899),
rev'd (on other grounds), 165 N. Y. 91, 58 N. E. 794 (1900). However, upon
a new action involving the same issues the granting of alimony was held
erroneous, but neither the granting of the order nor the acceptance of alimony
under the error constituted a waiver of the separation agreement, Chamberlain
v. Cuming, 37 Misc. 815, 76 N. Y. Supp. 896 (1902) ; see, also, Chamberlain v.
Cuming, 99 App. Div. 561, 91 N. Y. Supp. 105 (2d Dept. 1904), aff'd, 184 N. Y.
526, 76 N. E. 1091 (1906) ; Hofman v. Nestel, 146 App. Div. 305, 130 N. Y.
Supp. 775 (2d Dept. 1911). But the separation agreement and the husband's
liability thereunder is abrogated if the husband divorces the wife, Boate v.
Boate, 114 Misc. 321, 187 N. Y. Supp. 321 (1921).
Carpenter v. Osborn, 102 N. Y. 552, 7 N. E. 823 (1886) ; Clark v. Fosdick,
118 N. Y. 7, 22 N. E. 1111 (1889).
1 Galusha v. Galusha, supra note 2; Grube v. Grube, 65 App. Div. 239, 72
N. Y. Supp. 529 (1st Dept. 1901) ; Greenfield v. Greenfield, 161 App. Div. 573,
146 N . Y. Supp. 865 (1st Dept. 1914); Randolph v. Field, 165 App. Div. 279,
150 N. Y. Supp. 822 (1st Dept. 1914) ; Beebe v. Beebe, 174 App. Div. 408, 160
N. Y. Supp. 967 (2d Dept. 1916) ; Davis v. Davis, 195 App. Div. 430, 186 N. Y.
Supp. 805 (3d Dept. 1921) ; Butler v. Butler, 206 App. Div. 214, 201 N. Y. Supp.
111 (2d Dept. 1923) ; Rosenblatt v. Rosenblatt, 209 App. Div. 373, 204 N. Y.
Supp. 676 (4th Dept. 1924); Ascher v. Ascher, 213 App. Div. 183, 210" N. Y.
Supp. 515 (1st Dept. 1925); Solomene v. Solomene, 229 App. Div. 728 (2d
Dept. 1930) ; Taylor v. Taylor, 32 Misc. 312, 66 N. Y. Supp. 561 (1900). But
it must clearly appear that one of the terms of the separation agreement pro-
vided for the future support of the wife, Kelly v. Kelly, 61 Misc. 480, 115
N. Y. Supp. 587 (1908).
"Lehmann v. Lehmann, 137 Misc. 8, 244 N. Y. Supp. 265 (1930); see also
Galusha v. Galusha, supra note 2, at 646, 22 N. E. at 1117.
" Ryan, J., in Horschthal v. Horschthal, 134 Misc. 479, 480, 235 N. Y. Supp.
451, 452 (1929).
'Zimmer-v. Settle, 124 N. Y. 37, 26 N. E. 341 (1891); Dudley v. Fifth
Avenue Trust Co., 115 App. Div. 396, 100 N. Y. Supp. 934 (1st Dept. 1906),
affd', 188 N. Y. 565, 80 N. E. 1109 (1907).
"Butler v. Butler, sitpra note 6, at 216, 201 N. Y. Supp. at 113.
Atherton v. Atherton, 155 N. Y. 129, 49 N. E. 933 (1898), rev'd (on
other grounds), 181 U. S. 155, 21 Sup. Ct. 544 (1901) ; Shurman v. Shurman,
148 N. Y. Supp. 947 (1914).
"Clark v. Fosdick, supra note 5; Levy v. Levy, 149 App. Div. 561, 133
N. Y. Supp. 1084 (1st Dept. 1912) ; Van Horn v. Van Horn, 196 App. Div. 472,
188 N. Y. Supp. 98 (1st Dept. 1921); Westover v.- Westover, 133 Misc. 510,
232 N. Y. Supp. 184 (1929).
" Galusha v. Galusha, supra note 2; Barns v. Klug, 129 App. Div. 192, 113
N. Y. Supp. 325 (1st Dept. 1908).
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would be more equitable for the courts to hold-that upon the
remarriage of the plaintiff, the continuing obligation having ter-
minated and the absolute right to alimony being abrogated, the sep-
aration agreement, in so far as it provides for future support and
maintenance, should also terminate. In the instant case, the Court
expressly refrained from giving an opinion as to the wife's right
to support under the contract. 4
P. V. M., JR.
INFANTS-CONFESSION MADE BY DELINQUENT Boy WITHOUT
WARNING OF SELF-INCRIINATION-PiPOPER.-The defendant in-
fant under the age of sixteen years broke into a store and stole
$12.00. He was charged in Children's Court with juvenile delin-
quency. The hearing, which was held in the Children's Court, was
as follows: The boy was present in company with his mother,
sister, and the family clergyman. Before the boy was questioned
by the judge, he was advised, as well as the others present, that he
might have the aid of counsel if he or the others so desired. The
testimony of the boy sustained the charge beyond any doubt; indeed
there was a full admission and no attempt at denial. The boy was
thereupon adjudged a delinquent child and was committed to a State
Industrial School. On appeal, held, juvenile delinquency proceeding
not being a criminal one, there was neither right to nor necessity
for procedural safeguards prescribed by the Constitution and Statute1
People v. Lewis, 260 N. Y. 171, 183 N. E. 353 (1932).
No act or omission is a crime except as prescribed by Statute.2
As the power to declare what act or omission is a crime rests solely
with the Legislature, there is no doubt that it has the power to
declare that an act done by a child shall not be a crime, although
the same act, if committed by an adult, would be a crime.3 Under
Statute 4 the concept of crime and punishment disappears where an
act or omission of an infant under sixteen years would be a crime
if he were an adult. All suggestion and taint of criminality was
intended to be and has been done away with by Statute.5 For the
" Severance v. Severance, instant case, at 433, 183 N. E. at 909.
1 Children's Ct. Act of N. Y. (1930) §45.
2 N. Y. PENAL LAW (1909) §22-People v. Knapp, 206 N. Y. 373, 99 N. E.
841 (1912).
'Supra note 1.SIbid.
5 Supra note 1, par. 8: "This act shall be construed to the end that the care,
custody and discipline of the children brought before the Court shall approxi-
mate as nearly as possible that which they should receive from their parents, and
that as far as practicable they shall be treated not as criminals but as children
in need of aid, encouragement and guidance."
